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1.  Introduction
Philosophical discussion of conscious, personal-level inference has often 
focused on simple deductions, with only a small handful of premises, 
like modus ponens.1 Consciousness has, in this context, often been left as 
something of a global heading of the relevant inferences. Specifically, such 
questions as whether the different premises, or the conclusion, differently 
manifest in consciousness, or whether different notions, forms, or grada-
tions of consciousness are apt for their respective characterization, have 
not been much explored. When philosophical discussion of inference has 
turned to unconscious cognition, the focus has often been on quite differ-
ent, subpersonal processes. For example, it has been discussed whether 
the alleged unconscious inferences posited by some vision scientists to 
explain even low-level vision can qualify as genuine inferences.2 In these 
cases, none of the premises and, in some cases, not even the conclusion of 
the alleged inferences would be consciously entertained or even available 
to consciousness. In this chapter, I will look at a class of inferences that 
seem to fall somewhere between simple explicit deductions and subper-
sonal inferential processes on dimensions relevant to consciousness, viz. 
at certain non-demonstrative inferences. These are personal-level. They 
proceed from a consciously noticed fact, or apparent fact, to a similarly 
entertained conclusion. Yet they seem also to be sensitive to a rich stock 
of background information, not all of which seems to be consciously pre-
sent in quite the same way as certain more explicitly noted or considered 
elements of the thinker’s overall perspective. These inferences suggest 
that consciousness can vary, in potentially interesting ways, across the 
body of assumptions from which a given conclusion is drawn
The relevant sort of inferences may, I will assume, be exemplified by 
such cases as:
Getting Irony You overhear someone, known to be heading to a 
work retreat, casually remark that the evening will be spectacular. 
You are initially surprised, given what you assume to be to on their 
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agenda, your familiarity, such as it is, with their likings, views, and 
habits, the likely feelings of her addressees, etc. It dawns on you the 
intent must have been ironic.
Car Means Home As you approach your house a rainy Tuesday, 
you see your car parked outside. Drawing on what you know of your 
partner’s travelling habits, use of modes of transportation in different 
weathers, etc., you infer she is at home.3
Joke Getting You are reading a New Yorker cartoon, showing two 
men at a bar, one of whom, with a flustered, puzzled expression, 
tells the other ‘What I don’t, like, get is how she, like, figured out 
I was, like, having an affair with the, like, babysitter’. Drawing on 
various knowledge concerning, e.g., the speech mannerisms of young 
adults, how intimacy may bring imitation, how this might be unself-
conscious, the implications of having an affair and being found out, 
etc., you get what’s funny about this joke.4
These exemplify, I shall assume, non-demonstrative inference. Thus, Car 
Means Home is not to be construed as a deduction from two assump-
tions to the effect that the car is parked outside, and that if the car is 
parked outside, my partner is at home (or that whenever the car is parked 
outside, my partner’s at home).
The inferences are personal-level. They are attributable to you, not just 
to subsystems (though subsystems may of course have a role in explaining 
how and why they were drawn). Relatedly, they are in some sense con-
scious. You have some awareness of what you are thinking and why. In 
Getting Irony, for example, you are conscious of the remark as being ironi-
cally intended, and as being, probably, so intended since such-and-such 
activities, awaiting the speaker this evening, clearly would not be consid-
ered very exciting, given so-and-so features of the speaker and her address-
ees, and so forth. It is a familiar point, though, that the ease or readiness 
with which you can spell out your reasons, filling out the ‘such-and-such’s, 
‘so-and-so’s, and so forth’s, may vary across information you are relying 
on. In so far as this ease or readiness is an index of the extent to which, or 
the sense or manner in which, the information figures in consciousness, it 
raises the question in what ways consciousness extends among it.
That question is raised also by the commonplace distinction between 
what is at the forefront of one’s mind versus what lingers only more towards 
the back of one’s mind. Our examples invite description in these common-
place terms. In Getting Irony, say, it might be towards the fore of your 
mind that the speaker’s work retreats are known heavily to feature Insanely 
Fun Team Building Activities. You also recall, perhaps a tad more dimly, 
that the speaker and her addressees have lately voiced appreciation for 
@NeinQuarterly. Quite a bit further to the back your mind may be found 
presumptions that begin to approximate to, say, Gricean maxims, such as 
the idea that that people would not seriously assert what they clearly would 
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not be taken to believe. The latter does not seem to be entertained in the 
way the just-mentioned points are, even though you, at some level, know 
it, or something like it, to be true (at least assuming a broadly Gricean, or 
cognitivist, approach to pragmatics). The presumption would not strike 
you as an unfamiliar point, or simply as news, were it to be put to you.
More generally, personal-level non-demonstrative inferences seem not 
uncommonly to rely on a long tail of assumptions, where the latter differ 
in how salient or available they are. We could say a certain fore-v-back-
ground structure – or perhaps several such structures – hold(s) over them. 
What structures in consciousness do these correspond to?
The next section introduces a distinction between (comparatively 
simple) Boring and (more complex) Interesting Views of fore-v-back-
ground structures. Section 3 gestures at some motivations for Boring 
Views;  Section 4 at reasons for thinking Interesting Views may neverthe-
less merit exploration. Sections 5 and 6 take stock of some promising 
resources for an Interesting View, from, respectively, Sebastian Watzl, 
and Terry Horgan, Matjaž Potrč, and various co-workers. Some remarks 
of Edmund Husserl’s on what he calls the horizons of acts of conscious-
ness are drawn on in Section 7. These remarks suggest, I argue, ways 
of refining the resources charted in the two preceding sections, in order 
thereby to overcome some difficulties or limitations noted in those sec-
tions. Section 8 finds support for the indicated Husserlian ideas in psy-
chological work on gist or schema representations in perception and 
memory. That section also notes how a conscious role for gist or schema 
representations in cognition can be understood in terms of the idea that 
the phenomenology of thinking exhibits thematic unity (cf. Nes, 2012). 
Drawing on the picture emerging over Sections 5–8, Section 9 outlines 
an account of what I dub thematic gist in conscious inference. Section 10 
concludes.
2.  Two Views of Fore-v-Background Structures
What differences in consciousness do fore-v-background structures in 
inference correspond to? One might draw a rough and ready distinction 
between two types of view here.
The first are comparatively simple and boring – tendentiously, I dub 
them ‘Boring’. Views of this sort think fore-v-background structures 
can be described quite simply by specifying, for the various assumptions 
relied on, whether they are phenomenally conscious, access conscious, or, 
alternatively, how easily they can be brought to mind. In somewhat more 
formal terms, such views may be said to distinguish three background-
ing relations (relations by which an assumption, B, may or may not be 
backgrounded to another, A, or equivalently A foregrounded to B), and 
hold that fore-v-background structures can be fully described by describ-
ing their instantiation. Assumptions, here, can be considered thought 
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contents, corresponding to what is said by utterances. I will dub the three 
relations generic phenomenal, access, and availability backgrounding.
An assumption, B, is generically phenomenally backgrounded to 
another, A, if A is phenomenally conscious but not B. Now, it is disputed 
in what sense, if any, it is so much as possible for thought contents to 
figure in phenomenal consciousness.5 ‘Liberals’ about cognitive phenom-
enology hold that thoughts, including their conceptual contents, can be 
partly constitutive of what things are like psychologically for a subject. 
‘Conservatives’ by contrast limit phenomenal consciousness to lower-
level sensory or affective phenomena – impressions or imagery of shapes 
or colours, bodily sensations, etc. –, denying that thought contents can 
be partly constitutive of one’s overall phenomenal experience. It might 
be thought that, on a conservative view, no assumption can be generi-
cally phenomenally backgrounded to another, since no assumption can 
be phenomenally conscious. However, conservatives allow assumptions 
to figure in phenomenal consciousness as it were by proxy, in as much as 
they can be articulated verbally or can be associated with perceptions or 
imagery. Thus, a conservative might seek to define a non-vacuous generic 
phenomenal backgrounding relation, obtaining if A is so articulated or 
associated but not B. Tricky questions arise here, though. In just what 
detail, or with what degree of explicitness, need an assumption be elabo-
rated in inner or outer speech to evade the relevant backgrounding? What 
sorts of association between an assumption and imagery suffice? I shall 
however have to leave these questions for another occasion, or for con-
servatives to ponder. The working assumption here will be a liberal view.6
An assumption, B, is access backgrounded to another, A, if A is sub-
ject to access consciousness but not B. Here ‘access’ is understood in 
an occurrent and not merely dispositional sense. The assumption is not 
merely accessible but accessed. There are various ways of spelling out 
what this involves more precisely. For present purposes, though, we may 
adopt what Carruthers (2015, p. 48) has described as ‘the most widely 
endorsed notion of access-consciousness’, according to which:
[access] conscious states are ones that are generally, or globally, 
accessible to an extensive set of other cognitive systems, including 
those for forming memories, issuing in affective reactions, as well as 
a variety of systems for inference and decision making.
(Carruthers, 2015, p. 48)
Finally, B is availability backgrounded to A to the extent that A is more 
readily brought to mind than B. This is, to be sure, a vague, multidi-
mensional matter. The readiness for bringing something to mind can, 
plausibly, vary with the time, or the effort, or the nearness to hand of 
various apt cues, needed to bring the respective assumption to mind. The 
notion of ‘bringing to mind’ could be understood in terms of bringing 
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to either phenomenal or to access consciousness. Evidently, then, avail-
ability backgrounding could, and ultimately should, be unpacked into 
several dimensions, which might turn out to vary independently. For the 
purposes of this chapter, I shall however skate over these complications, 
resting content with a rough-and-ready notion of how easily a certain 
assumption is brought to mind.
The three backgrounding relations thus roughly distinguished are likely 
to be interrelated. In so far as phenomenal and access consciousness go 
hand in hand, so do the correlative backgrounding relations. Depending 
on how availability is fleshed out, one or both of generic phenomenal 
or access backgrounding implies availability backgrounding, though not 
conversely. Boring Views hold, again, that fore-v-background structures 
are adequately described just by describing the instantiation of these 
relations.
The alternative type of views is, in comparison, complex and inter-
esting – tendentiously, I call them ‘Interesting’. They allow the three 
aforementioned backgrounding relations but hold that the story of 
their instantiation is not the full story of fore-v-background. Different 
Interesting Views may offer different proposals as to what remains to 
be said. It might be argued there are backgrounding relations within 
phenomenal consciousness, whereby two assumptions may both be 
phenomenally conscious, yet unequally ‘prominent’ or ‘salient’, where 
this does not amount simply to a difference in access or availability-
to-access. It might be said that access consciousness itself is a graded 
matter, i.e. that two assumptions might both be accessed, but one more 
so than the other. Another line of thought here, to be developed in 
 Sections 6 through 9, is that information can be backgrounded by 
being, as it were, ‘nested’ or ‘condensed’ into other, more foregrounded 
mental states, from which it can then be unspun or decondensed, in 
characteristic ways.
3.  Boring Views
Boring Views are the default option, being simpler. Although rarely 
explicitly argued for, various dichotomies and associations are suggestive 
of such views.
As for dichotomies, we have the familiar, two-fold distinction between 
standing beliefs, more or less easily available to consciousness, and occur-
rent thoughts or judgements.7 In so far as we operate merely in terms of 
this distinction, the status of an assumption in or for consciousness would 
be specified just by specifying to which of these two classes it belongs. 
Plausibly, being ‘occurrent’, in the relevant sense, may understood in 
terms of either phenomenal or access consciousness. This classification 
would thus amount to describing relations of generic phenomenal or 
access backgrounding.
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As for associations, conscious thought has been equated with, or 
restricted to, that to which one intellectually attends. Thus, Graham 
Oddie remarks that ‘a belief is occurrent if it is the belief that you are 
consciously attending to’ (Oddie, 2005, p. 240, cited from Crane, 2013). 
Michael Martin writes:
In general, whatever we are prepared to call an object of thought – 
be it the things thought about, what one thinks about them, or the 
proposition one thinks in thinking these things – we can also take to 
be an object of attention. Conscious, active thought is simply a mode 
of attending to the subject matter of such thoughts.
(Martin, 1997, p. 77)
Now, suppose such a view is combined with a view of attention on which 
attention gets devoted to at most a small number (three or four, say) of 
objects or chunks of information and where either no difference is posited 
in how attention gets devoted among these objects or chunks, or, at least, 
any such difference is not supposed to make for any counterpart difference 
in consciousness. This suggests a view on which, to specify the role of an 
assumption in or for consciousness, we need just to specify the following: 
whether it is among the few things attended to, and thus conscious (phe-
nomenally or with regard to access); or else, how easily attention could be 
turned to it. That story would be within the genre of Boring Views.
Closely related arguments could be run in terms of the notion of work-
ing memory, or kindred notions of short-term memory capacities. The 
idea would be that thought is conscious (phenomenally or with regard to 
access) only if it is held in working memory, or maintained in some simi-
lar, short-term memory system.8 Again, such systems are often assumed 
to have a low capacity limit, being restricted to about three or four 
chunks of information.9 Suppose no difference is drawn with regard to 
how assumptions, activated in this system, figure in consciousness. That 
would suggest a view on which, to specify the role of an assumption in 
or for consciousness, we need just to specify whether it is activated in this 
system, or else how easily it could become so active. That story would, 
again, be within the genre of Boring Views.
No elaboration or evaluation of these lines of thought will be attempted 
in this chapter. I will rest content with gesturing towards some (mutually 
compatible) avenues along which a sympathizer with Interesting Views 
might seek out a response. First, it could be suggested that the evidence 
for the capacity limits on attention, or on working memory, only sup-
ports the weaker claim that correspondingly low limits apply, at least, 
to certain comparatively foregrounded elements or aspects of conscious 
thought. The evidence may not yet establish the stronger claim that such 
low limits apply to conscious thought tout court. Second, it might be 
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proposed that information might be attended to, or be held in the rel-
evant forms for short-term memory, in different ways, or to different 
degrees, where some of these differences make for or go along with a 
difference in how that information figures in consciousness. Section 5 
returns to this idea. Thirdly, it could be argued there are certain inter-
esting dynamics of consciousness, whereby information occurs to us in 
a manner revealing of, or indicative of, its status as partially filling out 
certain more schematic anticipations. These dynamics may be consistent 
with consciousness having a low capacity limit at any given moment, yet 
may be held to constitute an interesting form of backgrounding. Ideas in 
this territory are developed in Sections 6 through 9. Whether any of these 
avenues of response, or some others, will ultimately be successful must 
be left for another occasion. The emphasis of this chapter is on exploring 
promising resources for an Interesting View, not on defending such views 
against Boring ones.
4.  Interesting Views, Why Bother?
Interesting Views are perhaps interesting, but why think we need the 
further complexity they bring? A key motivation comes, I think, from 
two connected reflections. On the one hand, conscious thought might 
seem to be, on occasion, rather rich its content. On the other, on some 
such occasions, the various ingredients of the richness might seem 
not to be grasped or entertained in quite the same way: in particular, 
they might seem to be unequal with respect to their prominence or 
salience.
To begin with the first point, concerning richness: it is a familiar obser-
vation that it may take quite a few words to spell out what one is think-
ing in a given situation. Even after having gone to some length attempting 
to articulate what one is thinking of, how one is thinking of it, etc., one 
might still have a sense there is more that could be said. One’s thinking 
forms, it seems, a rather inclusive, multifarious, many-angled take on 
things.
The following passage from John Searle illustrates aspects of this 
richness:
Sally looks at Sam and suddenly has a thought in a flash: ‘That’s it!’ If 
asked to state the thought, she might begin, ‘Well, I suddenly realized 
that for the past eighteen months I have been wasting my time in a 
relationship with someone who is totally inappropriate for me, that 
whatever its other merits, my relationship with Sam was founded on 
a false premise on my part. It suddenly occurred to me that I could 
never have an enduring relationship with the head of a motor-cycle 
gang like the Hell’s Angels because . . .’ And so on.
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In such a case the immediate content tends to spill over, to connect 
with other thoughts that in a sense were part of the content but in a 
sense were not.
(Searle, 1992, p. 137)
Let’s suppose that, among the things Sally soon enough would say to fill 
out the ellipsis following ‘because . . . ’, is the thought that Hells Angels 
are associated with crime – dub this thought ‘Crime’. Although Crime is 
in a sense part of what Sally is thinking, it is, Searle suggest, not enter-
tained in quite the same way – it is not equally ‘immediate’ – as the first 
few things Sally is saying, such as, e.g., that she has been wasting eighteen 
months – dub the latter thought ‘Wasting’. This exemplifies the second 
point, about the apparently unequal prominence or salience among the 
things of which one is thinking.
It is not clear how such a structure could be captured on Boring Views. 
We cannot do justice to it just by saying that Crime is availability back-
grounded to Wasting. That feature would not distinguish Crime from 
myriad other thoughts that Sally very easily and quickly can retrieve, 
such as, say, the thought that her name starts with an ‘S’, that she lives 
in London, that London is the capital of the UK, etc. etc. None of the 
latter are in some sense on Sally’s mind here the way Crime may seem to 
be. Nor can we do justice to the structure by saying that Crime, unlike 
Wasting, is neither phenomenally nor access conscious. First, it is (or so 
we shall suggest) at least not clear that Crime is entirely unconscious in 
both these senses. Second, if indeed it were unconscious in these senses, 
then that status would, again, be shared with myriad other unrelated 
thoughts not currently on her mind, and so not distinguish Crime from 
the latter. If, on the other hand, we say Crime is phenomenally and access 
conscious, nothing has yet been said to distinguish it from, say, Wasting.
Could it be that, whereas Wasting is both phenomenally and access 
conscious, Crime is one but not the other? Now, Crime does seem to 
be access conscious, at least on the earlier-cited criterion, formulated by 
Carruthers. After all, Crime is available to systems for introspection, in 
as much as it will be among the things Sally reports herself to be thinking. 
It is available to, and indeed used by, systems of inference. For example, 
Wasting may be supposed to occur to Sally as an inference drawn, in part, 
from Crime. Moreover, Crime can partly explain her affective reaction: 
her present flash of revulsion towards the relationship might issue from, 
let’s say, a new-found, or newly intensified, antipathy towards crime, 
combined with Crime.10
If this is right, it leaves the option that Crime is access but not phe-
nomenally conscious whereas Wasting is both. However, that status 
on Crime’s part would not, arguably, distinguish it from various other 
ingrained beliefs or pieces of knowledge that seem to qualify as access 
conscious, in as much as they are regularly in use across several contexts, 
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but seem not be distinctively or specifically relevant in this case. Consider 
such elementary beliefs as, say, that unsupported heavy objects tend to 
fall downwards, that one and one is two, that people typically can see 
what is in front of their open eyes, etc. These beliefs inform inferences, 
decisions, and emotional reactions in innumerable contexts. We will 
readily volunteer that we have these beliefs if the question arises. It is at 
least not clear why they should not qualify as access conscious in Sally’s 
case. Yet they do not seem to concern what is currently flowing through 
Sally’s mind in the way Crime does.
Second, and irrespective of the last point, it might be insisted Crime plays 
some, even if merely peripheral, role in Sally’s experience of thinking – 
that it has some interesting manifestation in what it is like for her to be 
thinking as she is at the moment, even before she clearly articulates Crime, 
fleshing out the lacuna in ‘I could never have an enduring relationship 
with the head of a motor-cycle gang like the Hell’s Angels because. . . ’. 
We may contrast Sally here with Sally*. In place of Crime, Sally* harbor 
thoughts of how Hell’s Angels are given to noisy, swaggering pursuits. 
For Sally*, these thoughts combine with a dawning realization that calm 
and restful activities appeal so much more to her. Even before Sally* 
spells this out, the way in which her thoughts of Sam and HA are placed 
in a context not of crime but of noise and swagger might, arguably, make 
for a phenomenal difference with Sally. If this is so, it suggests Crime has 
some phenomenal role for Sally, if only a peripheral one.
These brief reflections are not, it goes without saying, intended to come 
even close to establishing Interesting Views as true. They are offered only 
to suggest grounds for thinking such views are at least worth exploring.
5.  Attention as a Structure Within Consciousness
William James described the role of attention, or what he variously termed 
‘interest’, in experience in terms of ‘foreground’ and ‘background’:
[T]he moment one thinks of the matter, one sees how false a notion 
of experience that is which would make it tantamount to the mere 
presence to the senses of an outward order. . . . Without selective 
interest, experience is utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and 
emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground – intelligible 
perspective, in a word.
(James, 1890, p. 402, cited from 
Watzl, 2017, p. 183)
James’s suggestion here is that inattention is a background within con-
sciousness. Besides James, such views of attention and consciousness 
have been suggested inter alia by Husserl (1913/1983, §92) and Searle 
(1992, pp. 137–9). I shall here, however, focus on a recent account due 
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to Watzl (2017), on which attention has the role of structuring mind, in 
general, and consciousness, in particular. Specifically, attention is viewed 
a process of prioritizing elements in one’s mental life – of putting these 
elements in relations of priority to each other, whereby they together 
form what Watzl terms a ‘priority structure’. The focus of attention cor-
responds to the content of the mental state with top priority (Watzl, 
2017, pp. 70–114). In so far as the mental states prioritized relative to 
each other are conscious, the priority structure constitutes or entails what 
Watzl dubs a ‘centrality structure’. This is a structure of conscious states 
related by a phenomenal centrality relation. The latter is the phenomenal 
counterpart or manifestation of priority relations (Watzl, 2017, pp. 183–
210). Conscious states necessarily partake in the process of attention, 
Watzl argues, in that they necessarily enter into centrality structures. 
However, they may be relatively peripheral in that structure, their con-
tents being relegated to a position far from the focus of attention (Watzl, 
2017, pp. 251–282).
Now, let’s say that B is inattentively backgrounded to A if B, like A, is 
consciously entertained but receives less attention than B and thereby is 
less prominent in consciousness than A; to put it Watzl’s terms, attention 
renders A more central than B (though both are conscious). I am inclined 
to think, and will anyhow here assume, that there is such a relation as 
being inattentively backgrounded, and that it is apt to at least in part 
illuminate the structure of consciousness in conscious inference.
The question is how far it goes in this respect. As Watzl acknowledges, 
it does not, as it stands, capture a certain distinction within the less-
than-focal aspects of one’s state of mind that was stressed by Aron Gur-
witsch (1964), and that arguably reflects a structure in conscious thought 
and inference. Consider Car Means Home. Here, we might suppose, the 
manifest presence of our car outside, and my concluding thoughts of my 
partner’s being at home are comparatively central in my consciousness. 
Ideas about her working schedule, preferred methods of transportation 
in different weathers, likelihood of going out a walk or jog around this 
time of day, etc. are more peripheral though still, at some level, assumed 
in the case at hand. We may contrast these ideas with, say, various bod-
ily or agentive experiences of mine as I am walking towards our house: 
the sense of my feet regularly touching the ground, the slight ache in my 
legs from walking up the hill, etc. These are also conscious, but not rel-
evant to or bound up with my inference in quite the way my ideas of my 
partner’s movement patterns are. Gurwitsch marked this putative differ-
ence by distinguishing my ambulatory sensations as ‘marginal awareness’ 
from my ideas of my partner’s various habits as a ‘thematic field’. Both 
differ from the ‘theme’, that is, from what is at the forefront of my aware-
ness or most gripping on my attention. The thematic field, unlike the 
margin, is however experienced as somehow relevant to the theme. In as 
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much as both thematic field and margin are inattentively backgrounded, 
that status does not distinguish between them.
One response here would be that there is no systematic difference in 
conscious character between margin and thematic field. It is just that we 
believe, or are disposed to believe, that items in the thematic field are rel-
evant in a way in which the margin is not. Alternatively, or in addition: it 
is just that a certain conscious thought, viz. that of my partner’s being at 
home, causally depends on the thematic field (henceforth simply ‘field’), 
or is dispositionally connected with it (I would, e.g., sooner or later 
invoke ingredients from the field if pressed to explain my conclusion), in 
ways in which it does not depend on, or connect with, the margin.
Watzl however does not make this move, and I suspect he is right not 
to do so. Instead, he proposes to account for the field-v-margin distinc-
tion by identifying the field with a certain sub-form of the periphery of 
one’s overall experience, dubbed the ‘coloring and sustaining periphery’, 
that is distinguished by a certain causal or counterfactual role vis-à-vis 
the center. Specifically, a part, Y, of one’s overall experience is in the 
coloring and sustaining periphery of another part, X, if Y is peripheral 
to X (i.e. X is more central than Y) and the fact that this is so (i) affects 
the ‘appearance properties’ of X (this is the ‘coloring’ aspect) and (ii) 
sustains the comparatively central status of X, in the sense that, had not 
Y been peripheral to X, X would be less central to the overall experience 
(this is the ‘sustaining’ aspect) (Watzl, 2017, p. 200–1). Here ‘appearance 
properties’ are defined as those properties of a phenomenally conscious 
episode ‘that contribute to the way an aspect of the world appears to the 
subject when she undergoes that episode’ (Watzl, 2017, p. 160). Such 
properties plausibly include the intentional properties of the episode, 
although they are not necessarily limited to such properties. If we apply 
this account to Car Means Home, the idea, roughly, would be that the 
presence in the periphery of my thoughts of my partner’s general travel-
ling routines affect how I think or conceive of our car’s and my partner’s 
location, and sustain the comparatively central status of my thoughts of 
the latter things. My bodily sensations of walking up the hill in contrast 
lack such a role.
I worry, though, that the relevant causal or counterfactual depend-
ence can be gotten by in too diverse ways in order adequately to cap-
ture Gurwitsch’s distinction. Could it not be that because of more or less 
ingrained habits, or my general constitution, there are certain trains of 
thought, let’s say about literary matters, that I am only able to pursue, 
or, at least, more prone to pursue, when comfortably seated? I now enjoy 
the tactile, proprioceptive, etc. experience as of being comfortably seated. 
My mind turns to a remark by a certain character in Madame Bovary. 
Bringing to mind, more or less peripherally, various earlier scenes and 
dialogues, it dawns on me that the remark was ironically intended. This 
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conclusion would not have come to the fore of my mind without the 
experience of being comfortably seated. Indeed, the conclusion would, 
arguably, not have come to the fore without the seated-experience being 
merely peripheral: had the seated-experience been more central, it would 
have distracted me from ever reaching the conclusion. So the chair- 
experience would seem to be in the sustaining periphery of the conclusion. 
Does its presence in the periphery also affect the appearance properties of 
the more central part of my experience? Arguably, it does, for my central 
thought of the remark made by the relevant literary character would not 
have been to the effect that the remark was ironic – an intentional prop-
erty of the thought, and so an appearance property thereof – had I not 
been comfortably seated as I am. Nevertheless, that comfortable experi-
ence seems merely marginal and no part of the thematic field. Called on 
to justify my conclusion, or, more loosely, to say what’s been on my mind, 
I would not invoke these cushy feelings but rather my more or less dim 
recollections about the other passages of the novel.
The underlying problem is that the causal cum dispositional terms in 
which Watzl aims to separate field from margin seem to be insufficiently 
tightly linked with the content-dependent connections, of relevance ver-
sus non-relevance, that separate the distinct ways in which field and mar-
gin stand to the theme.
6.  Chromatic Illumination and Looming Potentialities
Not much has been written in recent analytical philosophy on fore-v-
background structures in conscious inference; in particular, not much 
that goes beyond alluding to the distinctions drawn in a Boring View. An 
exception, apart from Watzl, from this trend is the account of ‘chromatic 
illumination’ due to Horgan, Potrč, and various co-workers.11 I will dub 
this team ‘HPA’. They concentrate on conscious abduction. Adverting 
to the frame problem in AI, and Jerry Fodor’s (1983) discussion of the 
Quinean and isotropic character of central cognition, they argue the 
rationality of abductive inference goes hand in hand with its sensitivity 
to broad ranges of information possessed by the thinker. Typically, they 
argue, much of this information is implicitly appreciated in drawing the 
inference. While not being at the forefront of awareness, it still in some 
sense registers in consciousness. Indeed, it is epistemically vital that it 
does, HPA argue. Its doing so explains how abductive inference can be 
rationally grounded from the thinker’s point of view in a way that con-
trasts with, say, the brute seeming rightness of gut feelings.
Adopting a ‘coloring’ metaphor akin to Watzl’s, HPA say background 
information ‘chromatically illuminate’ certain, more foregrounded pieces 
of information. The analogy is that of light sources affecting how a scene 
appears, without themselves being seen. When HPA proceed to cash-
ing out this metaphor, they stress, first, that chromatically illuminating 
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information is not ‘explicit’, and second, that it is associated with ‘loom-
ing potentialities’. I shall address these two ideas in turn.
What do HPA intend by the claim that the relevant information is not 
explicit? One way of understanding ‘explicitness’ here would be in terms 
of the personal-level representational format of the relevant information. 
Thus, it might said that, other things equal, information A is present to 
one in a more explicit way than information B, if A is verbally articulated, 
or imagined, or rendered perceptually apparent in greater detail than B 
is. However, HPA does not have such a personal-level notion of explicit-
ness in mind, but rather one defined by the representational format of the 
subpersonal processes that, on their view, implement sensitivity to such 
background information. That information is not explicit, they claim, 
in that it is not subpersonally represented through the tokening of LOT 
vehicles or similarly syntactically structured representations. Rather, they 
suggest it can be regarded as information implicit ‘in the weights’ of the 
connections among nodes of neural network (cf. Henderson and Horgan, 
2011, p. 224).
However, this conception of the subpersonal systems implementing 
conscious abduction seems, all by itself, to tell us rather little about how 
(if at all) implicit information manifests in consciousness. Notoriously, a 
network can give correct classifications or predictions, given such-and-
such inputs, without it being clear, to its designers or to theorists analyz-
ing it, just how it goes about doing it.12 In such cases, it is far from clear 
why the information associated with its weights should be any more 
readily available to an agent for whom the relevant network constitutes 
parts of her cognitive architecture. To be sure, the burgeoning research 
on neural networks contain various streams of work on how networks 
can be structured so as to make the grounds for their classifications (to 
put it loosely) more apparent.13 However, the need for some special 
design here underscores the point that information attributable to the 
weights in a network system need not, absent special designs, be a read-
ily available matter. This is not to say, of course, that HPA are wrong 
about the subpersonal architecture, just that the notion of inexplicit-
ness, glossed in these terms, does not seem all that revealing of how the 
relevant assumptions figure in or for consciousness (a claim with which 
HPA may well agree).
The second way in which HPA spell out what it is for some back-
ground information to chromatically illuminate more foregrounded 
considerations invokes the suggestive phrase of ‘looming potentialities’. 
Concerning the case of Joke Getting, they write:
One’s appreciation of implicit background information manifests 
itself experientially, in part, via an aspect of ‘looming potentiali-
ties’ concerning the joke, viz., a sense that one could, if suitably 
prompted by others or by oneself, manifest one’s appreciation of 
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such information – in overt linguistic behavior, and/or by explicitly 
bringing such information to mind in one’s conscious thought. One 
kind of looming potentiality, for example, is the capacity to spon-
taneously arrive at consciously explicit answers to suitable back-
ground-probing questions. (Roughly how old is the babysitter? Who 
is the ‘she’ who figured out that the guy is having the affair with 
babysitter? Etc.)
(Horgan and Potrč, 2010, p. 166; my italics)
Here, and elsewhere in HPAs writings, there are pointers towards differ-
ent interpretations of looming potentialities. On a deflationary construal, 
they consist in a capacity to use such-and-such information in so-and-so 
ways, e.g., to answer certain questions. On a more inflationary interpre-
tation, they consist in a sense of such a capacity.
The deflationary interpretation seems too deflationary. The capacity to 
bring information consciously to mind so at so answer questions bearing 
on that proposition, or on logically related propositions, it is not specific 
to background information relevant to the foregrounded conclusion at 
hand. As noted earlier in Section 4, any old proposition known very well 
and easily recalled meets that condition. Besides, the inflationary inter-
pretation seems a better fit for the phrase ‘looming potentiality’, suggest-
ing as the latter does that there is not (merely) a potentiality but one that 
‘looms’.
How, though, is the posited ‘sense of capacity’ to be construed, more 
precisely? One, rather natural, way to go here is to construe the ‘sense 
of. . . ’ idiom as patterning with ‘thought of. . . ’, ‘idea of. . . ’, etc. That 
is to take the phrase ‘sense of capacity’ as purporting to refer to an inten-
tional state of some sort, where the expression following ‘of’ specifies its 
intentional content. The sense of capacity would, then, be a mental state 
intentionally directed at a certain capacity. Yet what would its intentional 
content be, more precisely?
One might think its content would be, quite simply, that one has the 
capacity to bring out the relevant as-yet-unarticulated considerations. 
After all, the intuition we are supposed to capture here, or so one might 
think, it not just that we have a sense of a capacity to do something or 
other with the inference at hand – translate it into another language, 
commit it to memory, write it down, or what have you – but that one can 
spell out, or somehow make clear, that the conclusion holds because cer-
tain (as yet unarticulated) considerations. HPA indeed stress the content 
specificity of chromatic illumination:
[T]he ‘getting it’ aspect of experience is not some generic feature, 
such as experiencing oneself laughing or inclined to laugh (perhaps 
without knowing why). Rather, it is quite content-specific: some par-
ticular item(s) of explicitly conscious content (in this case, what the 
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guy at the bar is saying, and his obvious consternation) is appreci-
ated as funny by virtue of how those explicitly conscious items are 
relevantly interconnected with a rich body of pertinent background 
information. Thus, all those specific items of background informa-
tion are implicitly present in the conscious joke-getting experience, 
by virtue of the specific way that the experience is chromatically 
illuminated.
(Horgan and Potrč, 2010, pp. 164–165; 
original italics)
Suppose, then, that the sense of capacity, in Joke Getting, includes a 
sense that one could, upon the question of the age of the babysitter being 
raised, make clear that she is a teenager, where this presumed fact about 
her age – dub it Teenager – is among one’s background assumptions. 
Teenager, then, turns out to be part of the intentional content of the men-
tal state that is, or constitutes, the sense of capacity.
Yet how is Teenager represented, by virtue of being part of the inten-
tional content of the relevant mental state? If the sense of capacity 
represents (inter alia) Teenager in a way that is attentive or explicit or 
otherwise associated with foregrounded assumptions, we would expect 
the wrong prediction, viz. that Teenager is foregrounded. On the other 
hand, if it is represented in a way, call it WB, apt to make for back-
grounding, the question arises just what way this is. Recall that a sense of 
capacity was invoked precisely to account for how assumptions, such as 
Teenager in Joke Getting, can be implicitly, yet in some sense nevertheless 
consciously, appreciated in inference, figuring in a backgrounded way. If 
we invoke a sense of capacity to account for the way, WB, in which the 
sense of capacity to offer Teenager if so-and-so queried presents Teen-
ager, we clearly risk vicious circularity or regress. If, on the other hand, 
we offer some other story of WB, including, as a limiting case, a view of 
WB as a theoretical primitive in the characterization of consciousness, 
why could we not invoke WB directly in accounting for how Teenager 
and kindred assumptions are entertained? To posit a sense of capacity, in 
which Teenager is represented as part of a representation of what one has 
a capacity to make clear, would then seem to be a complicating maneuver 
not clearly called for.
These considerations suggest that, if invoking a sense of capacity is 
to account for a certain backgroundedness, other than mere inattentive-
ness, enjoyed by such assumptions as, say, Teenager in a case like Joke 
Getting, and the sense of capacity is indeed an intentional state, then 
that state better not be construed as including Teenager as part of its 
intentional content. How, then, is it to be construed? Could it be simply 
de re with respect to the underlying capacity? That is to say: could it take 
the form of a sense that one has this capacity, where the capacity thereby 
referred to is in fact a capacity to offer (inter alia) Teenager, if so-and-so 
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queried, although it is not represented as such? That proposal however 
seems to offer no account of how a suitable sort of specificity is secured. 
Although the capacity referred to is the specific capacity it is, nothing as 
yet accounts for how it is that it shows up mentally in some suitable, rel-
evant way, given this de re state. Consider the following analogy. A per-
son you are seeing may well be your old, red-haired, snub-nosed friend. 
If that is all we know, however, it is left open whether you are seeing 
him up-close and recognizably, or in the distance, at dusk, from behind, 
neither visibly red-haired, sub-nosed, nor even vaguely familiar to you.
Another way of downplaying the specificity of the sense of capacity, 
not going down the route of de re, is as follows. The sense of capac-
ity represents, it might be said, merely a capacity to defend, or anyhow 
spell out, the inference, leaving open in terms of just what considerations 
the defense or articulation will proceed. This may seem too unspecific, 
though. Recall our contrast between Sally and Sally* in Section 4. They 
both conclude that they have been wasting many months on Sam, for 
he is a HA member, and. . . . For Sally, thoughts of the criminality of 
HA would fill out the lacuna; for Sally*, thoughts of their noise and 
swagger. Part of the motivation for Interesting Views was the notion that 
this difference in background assumptions might go with a difference in 
their overall cognitive experience. If their different assumptions show up 
merely as a sense that they could spell out why Sam has been a waste, 
we have not captured this difference. If, on the other hand, we take their 
respective senses of capacity to include the distinct specific considerations 
in terms of which they would spell out the inference, we are back with the 
dilemma pointed out two paragraphs earlier.
In view of these difficulties, one might question whether our step of 
construing the sense of capacity as an intentional state was a misstep. 
Perhaps the ‘of. . . ’ in ‘sense of capacity’ should be taken to pattern 
with ‘sense of joy’, ‘experience of grief’, or ‘feeling of despair’. On this 
construal, the phrase following ‘of’ serves to classify the mental state in 
question, but not because it refers to or expresses part of an intentional 
content attributable to that state.14
A parallel worry of specificity arises, however. If the sense of capacity is 
a non-intentional state – a raw feel, if you wish – we still need to ask how 
these feels can and do vary. If they are comparatively generic, being, say, 
common to Sally and Sally*, they do not allow us to draw the distinc-
tion we wanted. What about the proposal that these feelings are, instead, 
highly specific, coming in myriad different flavors corresponding to the 
different specific background assumptions on which one might be rely-
ing? While this proposal avoids the problem for the intentional construal, 
viz. of embedding the very background assumptions as the intentional 
content of the feeling, it commits us to a faintly baroque duplication in 
the mind. Not only can one entertain myriad different contents, such as 
Teenager: one can also feel in myriad subtly different ways that, while 
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they somehow correspond to or are correlated with contents, remain raw 
feels and are not intentionally directed accordingly. At the very least, it 
is worth considering whether such a baroque view could be avoided.15
7.  Husserl on Horizon
HPA’s descriptions of how background aspects in conscious thought 
manifest as ‘looming potentialities’ recall Husserl’s account of what he 
called the ‘horizon’ of an act of consciousness. In one of his summary 
presentations of this aspect of consciousness, Husserl writes:
Every subjective process has a process ‘horizon’ . . . – an intentional 
horizon of reference to potentialities of consciousness that belong to 
the process itself. For example, there belongs to every external per-
ception its reference from the ‘genuinely perceived’ sides of the object 
of perception to the sides ‘also meant’ though not yet perceived, but 
only anticipated.
(Husserl, 1933/1960, p. 82)
The horizon of an act of consciousness, as Husserl conceives it, illustrates 
inattentive backgrounding, as attention is not yet drawn to things that 
are as yet ‘only anticipated’.16 More to the present point, his view of 
horizons connects with HPA’s views for two reasons. First, although Hus-
serl’s paradigm example of horizons in consciousness are from vision – 
specifically, the implicit sense that there’s more to be seen of a chunky 
object in view before us than what is manifest from our present viewing 
angle – he takes possession of a horizon to be a feature of any conscious 
process, which for him includes thinking. Second, and more specifically, 
there is a striking kinship between HPA’s talk of ‘looming potentialities’, 
and of our having ‘a sense of capacity’, and Husserl’s phrase ‘reference to 
potentialities of consciousness’. As for HPA on looming potentialities, a 
distinction can be drawn here between a deflationary and an inflationary 
construal of Husserl’s turn of phrase. One the deflationary reading, the 
key point is that there are certain further potentialities of consciousness 
associated with an actual conscious process. On the inflationary con-
strual, the key point is not (only) that there are these potentialities, but 
that something about the actual process or act of consciousness ensures 
that there is therein ‘reference to’ (Verweisung auf) these potentialities.17 
The questions how such a ‘reference’ should be understood (as a case of 
intentional directedness to the things referred, as a raw feel, or something 
else?), and, in particular, its degree of specificity, thus arises also with 
regard to Husserl’s notion.
Now, out of Husserl’s wide-ranging reflections concerning horizon, 
developed over decades, I shall here rest content with highlighting two 
putatively central suggestions, that seem helpful in connection with our 
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present concerns. The first has to do, roughly, with what happens when 
something anticipated comes to pass. Husserl writes that accounts of the 
horizon of acts of consciousness bring out
not only the actual but also the potential subjective processes, which, 
as such, are ‘implicit’ and ‘predelineated’ in the sense-producing 
intentionality of the actual ones and which, when discovered, have 
the evident character of processes that explicate the implicit sense.
(Husserl, 1933/1960, p. 85)
Husserl’s claim about the certain ‘evident character’ here concerns, in the 
first instance, the phenomenological inquirer who ‘discovers’ the relevant 
features of consciousness. When this inquirer succeeds in linking such-
and-such potential conscious acts to so-and-so actual ones, the former 
will, for her, have that evident character of explicating something implicit 
in the latter. However, since this inquirer is supposed to discover this 
through first-personal reflection on (including sympathetic imagination 
of) the conscious acts or processes in question, one might read Husserl as 
suggesting that at least some analogous sort of ‘evident character’ applies 
to the underlying acts of consciousness reflected upon. If you are seeing 
what strikes you as uniformly white football, then the experience of see-
ing more uniform whiteness upon spinning it around, or walking around 
it, will have a certain ‘evident character of making explicit’ something 
implicit in your prior experience. Presumably, this ‘evident character’ is 
at least akin to a sense of expectation-fulfilmet upon finding what one 
anticipated or was on the look-out for.18
This idea offers help with the problem, noted at the end of the last 
section, of suitably distinguishing between Sally’s and Sally*’s conscious 
inference. As we saw, the suggestion that they each have a (fairly unspe-
cific) sense of a capacity to spell out the grounds for their conclusion does 
not differentiate between them. Yet suppose the relevant capacity is trig-
gered, thanks to a query after the grounds. If thoughts of HA’s criminality 
come to the fore for Sally, they will (the suggestion goes) have a charac-
ter of making explicit something as yet implicit. If, on the other hand, 
thoughts of HA’s noise and swagger drew her attention, they would lack 
such a character (though Sally might, of course, still accept them as true). 
For Sally*, meanwhile, vice versa. Even if the capacity is not triggered, 
there is a dispositional difference between the two thinkers here that, 
arguably, helps account for the difference in their conscious thinking.
I am inclined to think there is a dispositional difference of this sort, 
and that it has a role to play in the story of how Sally and Sally* differ 
in their conscious inferential thinking.19 I am less sure, though, whether 
it is the full story. It is tempting to think that there also is, or at least 
might well be, a more occurrent, more-than-merely-dispositional differ-
ence between them.
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The second aspect of Husserl’s account of horizon to which I will draw 
attention provides clues, I think, for a way in which they can differ, a clue 
having to do with the degree of specificity in the ‘reference to potentiali-
ties’ of consciousness. Husserl underscores that horizons are character-
ized by a certain indeterminateness.20 For example, the perception of a 
die, from a given angle
leaves open a great variety of things pertaining to the unseen faces; 
yet it is already ‘construed’ in advance as a die, in particular as 
colored, rough, and the like, though each of these determinations 
always leaves further particulars open. This leaving open, prior to 
further determinings (which perhaps never take place), is a moment 
included in the given conscious- ness itself; it is precisely what makes 
up the ‘horizon’.
(Husserl, 1933/1960, p. 82)
The indeterminateness is comparative: the intentional content of certain 
anticipations that characterize the horizon is less determinate than the 
content of some (as yet merely potential) intentional states that corre-
spond to these anticipations. For example, a perception of the backside 
of the die (as yet a mere potentiality) would give a more detailed and 
specific presentation of its color, roughness, and so forth, than what 
is represented regarding these features already at the level of the hori-
zon. Likewise, in conscious non-demonstrative inference, a horizon here 
would be expected to provide a more indeterminate and generic indica-
tion of the considerations in terms of which the inference could be spelled 
out, and which the thinker may be disposed sooner or later to offer, than 
the contents of those considerations themselves.
Is there reason to think such comparatively indeterminate representa-
tions are in play, in anything like the way suggested by Husserl? The next 
section finds support thereof in psychological work on gist or schema 
representations in perception and memory.
8.  Gist in Perception and Memory
Our somewhat indeterminate sense of the die’s backside, in seeing it 
from a certain angle, exemplifies what Husserl distinguished as the 
‘inner horizon’ of our perception of that object. That it so say that it has 
to do with the perceived object itself more than its relations to its sur-
roundings. Our perception also has, Husserl argues, an ‘outer horizon’: 
a similarly indeterminate sense of the object’s setting (cf., e.g., Husserl, 
1948/1973, §8; Smith, 2003, p. 75–79). Thus, in a typical case, the die 
would be perceived to be resting on an approximately even surface such 
as table (as opposed to, say, hovering mid-air, as soap bubble might); 
be located in a furnished room (as opposed to an unfurnished one); be 
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indoors (as opposed to outdoors); be in a built environment (as opposed 
to a natural scene).
The idea that vision involves such fairly generic representations of set-
ting that objects before us inhabit is, as it turns out, susceptible of exper-
imental confirmation. Work on so-called gist perception indicates that 
vision provides representations of the overall gist, or generic type, of the 
scene before our eyes, of varying degrees of specificity, such as its being, 
say, an office, a room, indoors, a built environment, and so on.21 Gist 
representations are extracted very quickly. Interestingly, they seem not 
asymmetrically to depend or merely supervene on the perceptual segrega-
tion and representation of the individual objects making up the scene. 
This recalls Husserl’s view of outer horizons as at least coeval with, and 
not merely a consequence of, the perception as of determinate individual 
objects, of various sorts, making up the scene. Moreover, gist representa-
tions themselves require little attention, but play a role in directing atten-
tion within the scene.
While recent experimental work on gist perception is, in these regards, 
congenial to some important Husserlian views on outer horizon, there is 
to be sure the important difference that Husserl purports to be describing 
conscious experience while recent experimental work on gist perception 
tends to prescind from claims about consciousness. However, Fish (2013) 
and Bayne (2016) have recently argued, I believe plausibly, that gist rep-
resentations can, and often do, figure as aspects of the phenomenal char-
acter of perception.
The idea that we form an impression of the gist, or generic type, of 
scenes before our eyes was much stressed by the psychologist Frederick 
Bartlett:
Suppose an individual to be confronted by a complex situation. . . . 
[I]n this case an individual does not normally take such a situation 
detail by detail and meticulously build up the whole. In all ordinary 
instances he has an over-mastering tendency simply to get a general 
impression of the whole; and, on the basis of this, he constructs the 
probable detail. Very little of his construction is literally observed 
and often, as was easily demonstrated experimentally, a lot of it is 
distorted or wrong so far as the actual facts are concerned. But it is 
the sort of construction which serves to justify his general impression.
(Bartlett, 1932, p. 206)
The content of the ‘general impression of the whole’ here corresponds to 
the content of a gist representation. Such impressions not only play a role 
in perception, Bartlett argues, but also, importantly, in memory, where 
they influence what is recalled. For example, when later trying to recall 
a story apt to strike one, generically, upon first hearing it, as concern-
ing a battle, one would, other things equal, be more likely to recall – or 
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misrecall – certain weapons being used (as one would typically expect to 
be in a battle) than one would be to remember such putatively irrelevant 
points of information as the names of the protagonists (Bartlett, 1932).
Several studies on memory, from the 1970s onwards, have supported 
this point. Taking over a term, ‘schema’, of Bartlett’s, although recasting 
its theoretical content, these studies posit, under that label, compara-
tively generic representations of various categories, representations that 
include, or are linked with, a cluster of tacit expectations of what would 
typically be go together with the category in question. Thus, a schema 
for office might include the expectation that it is an indoor space, with 
desks and chairs, computers, books or papers. Having been presented 
with a scene apt to trigger this schema, subjects are, other things equal, 
more likely later to recall it – or misrecall it – as containing schema-
related objects of the noted sorts than they are to recall such schema-
unrelated objects as, say, a rug on the floor (Brewer and Treyens, 1981; 
Webb, Turney, and Dennis, 2016). In a similar vein, studies of how clas-
sic experiments are reported in the scientific literature, or described by 
working scientists in the relevant areas, suggest that the findings of these 
experiments are recalled as skewed in direction of what one expect an 
experiment stereotypically to deliver (Vicente and Brewer, 1993). These 
findings fit broadly with the picture Bartlett outlines when he suggests 
that much, if not all, of the ‘probable detail’ recalled is served up through 
an unconscious, constructive process, geared at yielding an overall recol-
lection wherein that detail ‘justifies’ or, as Bartlett (1932, p. 207) also 
puts it, ‘satisfies’ or ‘fortifies’ the general impression.
As in perception, there is evidence that such schematic, or gist-
directed, representations in reasoning and recall require little attention. 
Subjects are more easily distracted, resulting in poorer performance, in 
tasks requiring more specific, detailed representations than in those apt 
to be solved in terms of gist representations (Abadie, Waroquier, and 
Terrier, 2016).
Again, as in the case of perception, work on schematic or gist-directed 
representations in memory and reasoning since the 1970s has largely pre-
scinded from claims about consciousness. Bartlett, however, stressed the 
conscious dimensions of recall. Elaborating on ‘the general impression of 
the whole’ posited in the passage quoted earlier, he writes:
Ask the observer to characterise this general impression psychologi-
cally, and the word that is always cropping up is ‘attitude’ . . . . The 
construction that is effected is the sort of construction that would 
justify the observer’s ‘attitude’. Attitude names a complex psycho-
logical state or process which it is very hard to describe in more 
elementary psychological terms. It is, however, as I have often indi-
cated, very largely a matter of feeling, or affect.
(Bartlett, 1932, p. 206–7)
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To illustrate, Bartlett says one’s ‘attitude’, in recalling a story, might be 
characterized by a feeling or sense of the story to be recalled as being 
‘exciting’, ‘adventurous’, ‘like what I read when I was a boy’ (1932, 
p. 207) or meriting some similar, fairly generic label.22
In earlier work, I have argued that conceptual content contributes to 
the conscious character of thinking by providing its thematic unity.23 For 
example, suppose you are thinking of a certain school you are contem-
plating attending. This will not, typically, be not (just) an experience 
of visualizing such-and-such constellations of shapes and colours (ones 
typical of school buildings, classrooms, teachers, etc.), having so-and-
so phonological strings floating through one’s mind (intoning, say, what 
happens to be the name of the school, or the courses one will be taking), 
having various ticklish, nervous or excited sensations in one’s stomach, 
etc. In so far as one’s thinking implicates such imagery or sensations they 
are not, typically, experienced as not having anything to do with one 
another. Rather, in such an episode, the sensory-affective contents would 
typically be felt to revolve around a common subject matter or theme, viz. 
one provided by the conceptual content of one’s thinking, such as, in this 
case, a content along the lines of what would going to this school be like?
In that earlier work, it was left open how overarching or specific the 
relevant thematic-unity-providing conceptual contents would be. It is 
plausible to think, however, that episodes of thinking can have overlap-
ping unities of subject matter, at different levels of grain. Consider the 
experience of comprehending a story of a Sunday outing. This cognitive 
episode might be unified overall as concerning a trip to the beach. At 
more fine-grained levels, it might be unified as having to do with, first, 
the drive to the beach, then a struggle of parking the car, then finding a 
place to put up a tent, etc.24 In such a case, the more fine-grained unities 
would, typically, be experienced as filling in details of the more coarse-
grained, overarching thematic unity. Plausibly, the sense of the detail as 
‘filling in’ an outline here is akin to the feature of recollection alluded to 
by Bartlett, when he says the detail justifies, satisfies, or fortifies one’s 
general impression.
I will propose, then, that Bartlett’s ‘attitudes’ illustrate, with regard to 
the content of the ‘general impression’ they convey of what is there to be 
recalled, a special case of thematic unity, provided by conceptual content. 
In particular, it is a case thereof where the unity is of the fairly generic, 
coarse-grained nature typical of schemas. I will refer to this special case 
of thematic unity as ‘thematic gist’. The next section outlines a role for 
such thematic gist in conscious inference.
9.  Thematic Gist in Conscious Inference
Conscious inferences are, I will assume, conscious in at least the following 
respects. The conclusion of the inference, C, is consciously entertained, 
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as are at least some of the grounds from which C is inferred. Label the 
grounds so entertained ‘G’. Moreover, the subject has some sense, notion, 
or ‘grip’, at the level of consciousness, of the relevant grounds G as bear-
ing a suitable support or implicational relation to C.25 To fix ideas, I will 
assume the latter relation takes the form of natural meaning, in the sense 
of Grice, in the cases where the conclusion is categorically endorsed on 
the basis of the relevant grounds.26 However, nothing will hang on this 
choice among candidate support or implicational relations.
The sense of G as meaning (/implying/supporting/. . .) C can, I will 
propose, go along with, or take the form of, a certain sense of how or 
why G means C. One’s grip on G, C, and their interrelations, can be 
such that one has a feeling of G as elucidably meaning C. To get a rough 
idea of the kind of ‘feeling’ or ‘sense’ at issue here, it may be useful to 
contrast the non-demonstrative inferences we have been considering with 
a simple, basic and immediate deductive inferential step. Consider, say, 
a conjunction elimination inference, from the presumed fact that P and 
Q to the conclusion that P. Here, if faced with the question how or why 
the presumed fact that P and Q means that P, one would typically find 
oneself, straight off the bat, drawing a blank. At least at first blush, one 
would typically be at a loss for what if anything that even could elucidate 
how or why this is so.27 Conscious non-demonstrative inferences are, it 
seems, typically quite different. In finding the presence of my partner’s 
car outside to mean that she’s at home, in Car Means Home, I seem to be 
alive to the possibility of spelling out or elucidating how or why this is 
so. I may not already consciously entertain the specific answers I poten-
tially could articulate. I may not already consciously have in mind, even 
in an inattentive way, such specific assumptions as, say, that she tends 
to take the car if going out, at least until around mid-to-late afternoon, 
and at least if it is raining or rain threatens (which it does). However, 
I might, and perhaps not uncommonly do, already entertain an idea of 
the gist or drift of these considerations. This gist is one that I could, per-
haps, give voice to in some such words as ‘The car’s being there means 
she’s at home – because, you know, her habits of getting around, and the 
weather’, or perhaps something even more schematic as ‘. . . because, you 
know, her habits’.
More generally, then, one could be said to have a sense of G as mean-
ing C, elucidably, viz., along the lines of H. Otherwise put: one could be 
said to have a feeling of G as meaning, because of H, C. Here, ‘H’ holds 
the place for a schema or gist representation, adverting to the drift of a 
possible elucidation. In Husserlian terms, H predelineates certain further 
thoughts, spelling out how or why G means C. What fills the place of H 
are as it were keywords dimly plastered in consciousness.
Having such a sense or feeling would, at least typically, involve or man-
ifests in a disposition, upon the question arising how or why G means C, 
not only to venture to explain (to oneself or others) that this is so because 
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of such-and-such considerations, H*, having to do with H, but also to 
find such considerations, when brought consciously to mind, as fitting in 
with the already assumed gist, H. To speak with Bartlett, the considera-
tions H* occur to one as ‘justifying’, ‘fortifying’, or ‘satisfying’ H. To 
speak with Husserl, they have ‘the evident character’ of explicating the 
anticipated theme.
Such a disposition might be finkish (or, to be precise, ‘reverse cycle’ 
finkish, cf. Lewis, 1997): raising the question how G means C might 
prompt one to reconsider whether G means C at all, or whether, in so far 
as it does, it has anything to with H.28 Also, it is a good question to what 
extent one needs to be able to offer considerations H* that are apprecia-
bly more specific or detailed than H itself. Perhaps all one is able to offer, 
at least in any outwardly articulated way, in a case where Car is taken to 
mean Home because of travelling habits, would be something like: ‘Well, 
you know, because of the way she tends travel around’. This would effec-
tively amount to a restatement rather than an elaboration of H. However, 
even in this case, there would, typically, be an awareness of the potential 
for more to be said about these travelling habits, of relevance to the ques-
tion at hand, even though one might not succeed in readily articulating 
these matters or clearly recalling it from memory. This is another reason 
not simply to reduce the sense or feeling of G as elucidably, viz. along the 
lines of H, meaning C, to a disposition to offer specifications of H.
What does the view thus outlined imply for fore-v-background struc-
tures in conscious non-demonstrative inference? If the generic, gist-like 
representations, playing the role of H, are a case of thematic gist in the 
phenomenology of thinking, they partially constitute the phenomenal 
character of one’s thinking. They would, then, not be generically phe-
nomenally backgrounded. However, in as much as such representations 
demand little attention, they may be expected to be inattentively back-
grounded to other aspects of one’s inference, such as the conclusion, or 
certain salient grounds. In proposing that inattention may leave aspect 
of one’s mental life conscious, though peripherally so, the view is, of 
course, in line with Watzl’s picture. However, it offers another account of 
how these generic representations differ from mere marginal awareness. 
They differ from the margin not, or not merely, thanks to the causal cum 
dispositional properties Watzl adverts to in his account of the coloring 
and sustaining periphery, but because their conceptual content provides 
a gist – a form of overarching thematic unity – that subsumes, in a puta-
tively illuminating way, the conclusion reached along with any more fore-
grounded reasons, as well as further information that the subject may be 
disposed to provide to elaborate the gist in question.
The outlined account agrees with that of HPA in holding that conscious 
non-demonstrative inference has an aspect well captured by their sugges-
tive phrase ‘looming potentialities’. The account seeks a balance between 
too much and too little specificity in the ‘looming’. On the one hand, the 
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content of the specific considerations that the thinker, typically, can spell 
out does not loom to her; on the other, it is not left entirely open what their 
content might be: their gist, or drift, is what looms. The word ‘looming’ 
connotes something approaching, impending, or similarly future-directed, 
an orientation explicit in Husserl’s characterization of horizons as involv-
ing a certain anticipation. The role gist-representations have been found, 
by Bartlett and later researchers, to play in recall fits in with their having 
a future-directed character, in so far as the representations figure in an 
‘attitude’ felt as playing a role in setting up and controlling the process of 
retrieving further details from memory. Even if no such further details are 
immediately forthcoming from the process, it is of a piece with their figur-
ing for in the manner of keywords that there is an awareness as of there 
being at least the potentiality of such further details turning up.
The more specific considerations, H*, spelling out H are indeed avail-
ability backgrounded. However, unlike myriad well-known familiar facts 
that putatively are not at all on one’s mind in the situation at hand – what 
one’s name is, where one lives, whether cars typically weigh more than 
bicycles, etc. etc. – they are not merely so backgrounded. For one thing, 
they fall under a gist consciously entertained. For another, the thinker is 
disposed, by virtue of entertaining that gist, to experience them as filling 
in that gist, upon their consciously coming to mind. We may say, just to 
put a label on it, that they are condensed-into-gist backgrounded.29
How pervasive is thematic gist, and the just-outlined correlative fore-
v-background structures, in personal-level non-demonstrative inference? 
I have not sought to establish it is universal or even widespread. The aim, 
rather, has more been to articulate a possible structure of consciousness, 
one that fits with, or at least is in the spirit of, independently plausible 
phenomenological claims, and that draws on well-attested psychological 
mechanisms. The phenomenological claims include the idea that atten-
tiveness can make for a fore-v-background structure within phenomenal 
consciousness; that an important aspect of our consciousness of things, 
at least often, is an attendant sense that there is more to be gathered 
or made clear about the things in question; that conceptual content can 
bestow thematic unity on thinking; and that there can be a feeling of fit 
or rightness when information occurring to us fits certain expectations. 
The psychological mechanisms include the role of gist representations or 
schemas in memory and recall. I take to be plausible that thematic gist 
actually characterizes at least some conscious non-demonstrative infer-
ences, and perhaps commonly does so. Exploration of its actual incidence 
must however be left for another occasion.
10. Conclusion
Conscious non-demonstrative inferences often seem to rest on rich body 
of assumptions that are unequally salient in or available to consciousness. 
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A fore-v-background structure, or several such structures, seems to hold 
across them. According to Boring Views such structures can be described 
by specifying, for the various assumptions in question, whether they are 
phenomenally conscious, or access conscious, or else how easily availa-
ble they are to such consciousness. Interesting Views hold that this is not 
the full story of fore-v-background structures. I have gestured at some 
reasons for thinking Interesting Views at least merit exploration. Build-
ing on recent work due to Watzl, and to Horgan, Potrč et al., though 
modifying, supplementing, or buttressing some their ideas (drawing here 
on some of Husserl’s views on horizons of acts of consciousness, and 
on psychological work on gist representations in perception and mem-
ory), I have outlined a conception of thematic gist in non-demonstrative 
inference. According to this view, background assumptions in non-
demonstrative inferences may be condensed into a consciously, although 
inattentively, entertained notion of the drift of a possible elucidation of 
how or why such-and-such salient grounds mean (or imply, or support) 
that so-and-so conclusion holds. Having such a notion explains why one 
is disposed, upon seeking to offer such an elucidation, not only to give 
an account with the relevant gist but also to experience it as filling in an 
already anticipated outline.30
Notes
 1. See, e.g., Carroll, 1895; Boghossian, 2014; McHugh and Way, 2016, 2018.
 2. See, e.g., Ludwig, 1996; Ludwig and Munroe this volume; Orlandi, 2014; 
Rescorla, 2015, this volume.
 3. The example is adapted from Nes, 2016, which argues for the aptness of 
using ‘means’. Nothing here however hangs on the choice between ‘means’ 
and such alternative expressions as ‘implies’, ‘supports’, or ‘indicates’.
 4. This example is due to Horgan and Potrc, 2010, 2011.
 5. For overviews, see, e.g., Bayne and Montague, 2011; Hansen, 2019.
 6. In particular, the view developed in Sections 8 and 9 builds on aspects of my 
defence of a liberal view in Nes, 2012.
 7. See, e.g., Davis, 2005, pp. 10–13; Boghossian, 2019, p. 102.
 8. For such a view, see Carruthers, 2015.
 9. See, again, Carruthers, 2015; Cowan, 2000.
 10. To be sure, some other aspects of Sally’s current thinking, such as Wast-
ing, might be even more highly activated and available for such systems or 
capacities. So if these notions of access were a matter of more or less, Wast-
ing might be more access conscious than Crime. But Boring Views, we are 
assuming, are not grading access consciousness in this way.
 11. See Horgan and Potrč, 2010, 2011; Henderson et al., 2017; Henderson, 
Horgan, and Potrč this volume.
 12. See, e.g., Lipton, 2018.
 13. Cf, e.g., Lakkaraju et al., 2017.
 14. It is worth noting that this construal of ‘experience of grief’ etc., while it 
allows for a non-intentional understanding of the mental states in question, 
does not require it. Even so, if an experience of grief is intentional, what 
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makes it the distinctive intentional state it is is not its being directed at grief 
itself, but rather certain grievous features of one’s life or circumstances.
 15. In their most recent work, HPA qualify the assumption of content specific-
ity, writing that ‘chromatic illumination sometimes might constitute implicit 
appreciation of some morphological content or other, without constitut-
ing implicit information of any specific, fully determinate, morphological 
content’ (this volume, nt. 11). They do seem to hold, though, that content 
specificity often or even typically holds for chromatic illumination (and so, 
presumably, for the looming potentialities in terms of which chromatic illu-
mination is cashed out). If they do not hold this, then the account outlined 
in what follows may turn out to be congenial to HPAs most recent view, at 
least as far as the issue of content specificity goes. The account outlined in 
this paper could then be regarded as one that articulates in slightly different 
terms, and motivates from somewhat different angles, the just cited sugges-
tion of HPA’s.
 16. See Husserl, 1913/1983, §27, §83. Cf. also Smith and McIntyre, 1982, 
pp. 236–239, and nt. 20.
 17. I do not purport to suggest that ‘reference’ in these passages of Husserl’s 
means what it means in post-Fregean analytical philosophy of mind and lan-
guage. The point is just that their inclusion suggests there is more to the hori-
zonal dimension than the mere capacity for or potentiality of such-and-such 
further conscious acts.
 18. In their most recent work, HPA make a closely related point, noting that ‘the 
conscious answers [to probe questions about an inference] are not experi-
enced as arising ‘out of the blue,’ with no intuitive sense of why or how they 
are pertinent to the funniness of the joke’ (this volume, p. 244).
 19. To say the posited difference between Sally and Sally* here is dispositional is 
not to say that it is merely counterfactual, pace Yoshimi’s (2016) construal of 
what a Husserilian horizonal dimension of consciousness comes to. Notori-
ously, a mere counterfactual difference could be secured by a ‘counterfactual 
intervener’ causing Sally and Sally* to have suitably different feelings in the 
event that so-and-so questions arise even if they are psychologically the same 
prior to the question arising.
 20. Smith and McIntyre, 1982, p. 238 et passim stress this aspect of Husserl’s 
views of horizon. They make the further move of distinguishing two sorts of 
horizon, a ‘horizon of indeterminacy’ corresponding to the present aspect, 
and a ‘horizon of inattention’ corresponding to the aspect of inattentiveness 
noted earlier (cf. nt 12 and attached text). However, as they acknowledge, 
Husserl characterizes horizons, under the same heading, is in terms of both 
inattention and indeterminacy, in such works as Ideas (1913/1983). At the 
very least then, he supposed these forms of horizon to typically go hand in 
hand.
 21. For a review, see Aude, 2015.
 22. Though Bartlett says ‘affect’, it is clear from his examples and discussion that 
the feeling in question need not have much in the way of affective valence, 
i.e. a pleasant or displeasant tone, but could be largely cognitive, as in the 
case of a sense of confidence or hesitation. See also Larsen and Berntsen, 
2000.
 23. Nes, 2012.
 24. Schemas for how activities, of such-and-such types, stereotypically unfold 
are often referred to as ‘scripts’, cf., e.g., Schank, 1999.
 25. For an argument that these features are required for conscious inference, see 
Nes, 2016.
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 26. See, again, Nes, 2016.
 27. Given some formal schooling in logic, one could come up with something to 
say here, e.g., invoke a theoretical characterization of logical consequence. 
The point is that the capacity to offer such a reply seems optional in relation 
to, and not to be in any direct way reflective of, the structure of one’s con-
scious awareness in competently drawing the inference.
 28. Cf. nt. 15 and attached text.
 29. The ‘condensation’ posited here might recall, but should be distinguished 
from, Siewert’s (1998, p. 278) description of thoughts that are ‘remarkably 
complicated, so that to say what one was thinking would require a lengthy 
syntactically complex utterance – but [that nevertheless] occurs, wordlessly, 
without imagery, condensed, and evanescent’. For Siewert, ‘condensation’ 
does not imply that the complicated content of these thoughts is not, all of 
it, consciously entertained, but rather relates to how that content is, as it 
were, lifted out and freed in consciousness from the burdens of the words 
or imagery needed to articulate it. In contrast, the entire content of thoughts 
that are condensed-into-gist backgrounded are not consciously entertained, 
only their gist it. I do not deny some thought are condensed in Siewert’s sense, 
but want to suggest at least some background assumptions that seem some-
how to manifest in consciousness are better construed as condensed-into-gist 
backgrounded.
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